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THE FEEDING OF THE FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND: CITIES 
AND AGRICULTURE IN EARLY ISLAMIC MESOPOTAMIA 
By HUGH KENNEDY 
This paper discusses the impact of the foundation of major cities in Mesopotamia in the early Islamic period 
(c. 636-900 CE) and their impact on the agricultural economy and rural settlement in the area. It considers the 
potential agricultural productivity of the area, the availability of river transport, the fiscal structure of the early 
Islamic state and the way in which it created demand for foodstuffs, and the development of the qafica as a form 
of landholding which provided security of tenure and hence the encouragement of long-term investment in 
agricultural infrastructure. 
The first two centuries after the Islamic conquest saw the foundation of a number of new towns 
in Iraq, notably Basra, Kufa and, above all, Baghdad.1 These new towns were of enormous 
importance politically, economically and culturally to the emerging Islamic state and, without them, 
the early Muslim world would have looked very different. Although the three cities were different in 
many ways, they shared two common characteristics. The first was that, with the possible exception 
of the old Sasanian capital at Ctesiphon/al-Mada'in, they were vastly larger than any of the small 
towns of the preceding period. Furthermore, they were also much bigger than the Basra and Baghdad 
of the eleventh and twelfth centuries CE. Not until the late twentieth century did either of these cities 
attain the population levels of the early Islamic period. Such precocious and exuberant urban 
development clearly demands some historical scientific investigation. 
Estimates of the population of Baghdad at the height of its prosperity in the late eighth and ninth 
centuries suggest that it is likely to have been half a million or more.2 The figure of eighty thousand 
given for the number of muqatila fighters settled in Basra in the years after its foundation in 636 
suggest a population of at least 250,000.3 
In this paper I will argue that the development of these very large cities was the result of four 
different political social and economic factors, which together formed a sort of virtuous circle. All 
four were essential to this extraordinary pattern of urban growth. The first was the agricultural 
potential of the lands of Greater Mesopotamia,4 a potential that was largely unrealized until 
activated by man-made irrigation systems. The second was the river system, which permitted the 
transport of large quantities of grain and other foodstuffs. The third was the social and fiscal 
structure of the early Islamic state, which led to the emergence of a large body of people who were 
paid cash salaries by the administration and as such generated demand for supplies of all sorts. The 
fourth and final element was the working out of a legal framework for landownership, which gave 
individuals security of tenure (at least in theory) and encouraged them to invest in projects of 
agricultural expansion. These factors will now be considered in turn. 
1
 For the Muslim conquest of Iraq, F. M. Dormer, The 
Early Muslim Conquests (Princeton, 1981) 157-220. The best 
introduction to the social and economic history of Iraq 
in this period remains M. Morony, Iraq after the Muslim 
Conquest (Princeton, 1984). 
2
 The best discussion of the size and population of the city 
remains J. Lassner, The Topography of Baghdad in the Early 
Middle Ages (Detroit, 1970) 158-60. He suggests a built-up 
area of some 7,000 hectares (compared with an estimated 
540 hectares for Ctesiphon and 1,400 hectares for Constan-
tinople intra muros) with a population of at least 280,000, 
adding that "a figure twice that does not seem altogether 
impossible". 
3
 The muqatila were the troops of the early Islamic state, 
paid pensions and enrolled in the diwans. For the numbers 
see al-Baladhurl, Ansab al-ashrafiv pt. a, ed. M. Schloess-
inger (Jerusalem, 1970) 190. 
4
 For the purposes of this article, Greater Mesopotamia 
includes the area of modern Iraq, but also the valleys of the 
Middle Euphrates and its tributaries (notably the Khabur 
and Balikh) now within the borders of modern Syria, and the 
plains of Khuzistan, now in modern Iran. 
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Agricultural fertility 
The lands of Greater Mesopotamia,5 if properly irrigated and managed, could attain a productivity 
which could be found nowhere else in the Islamic world. Estates in the alluvial lands of the Sawad 
of Iraq and the riverain areas of the Euphrates valley areas could be extremely profitable for those 
who owned them, supporting a gracious and cultivated life in palace and city. Rough calculations 
based on early cAbbasid revenue lists suggest that the alluvial lands of southern Iraq generated four 
times as much tax revenue as the next richest area of the Islamic world, Egypt, and five times as 
much as all of Syria and Palestine combined.6 This intensive agriculture was almost entirely 
dependent on artificial irrigation. Apart from some areas in the piedmont of the Zagros mountains, 
there were no areas where people could rely on the 200 mm of rainfall per year which would sustain 
dry farming. Basra in the south only has an average of 60 mm per year: without irrigation, these 
lands would be as arid and desolate as the desert which separates them from Syria and Palestine. 
There were substantial volumes of water not only in the Tigris and Euphrates but in the smaller 
rivers like the Khabur and Diyala which flowed into them. But while the quantity of water was 
reasonably reliable, the irrigation system needed constant investment and maintenance. In this 
environment, almost all major irrigation was gravity fed. This meant that water had to be carried in 
canals which were higher than the surrounding land. This in turn meant that the system was highly 
vulnerable: breaches in the banks would cause water to flood out into the fields and be lost. There 
were other hazards. If the gradient were not steep enough, silt would be deposited on the bottom of 
the canal and would have to be re-excavated at great expense. If the gradient were steep enough, the 
river would scour itself but the pressures on the banks would be more urgent. And then, as the 
cultivators of Basra were to find in the third/ninth century, there was the issue of salinization; lack 
of proper drainage would result in the build-up of salts on the surface of the soil so that even the 
back-breaking labour of thousands of black Zanj slaves could not restore it to fertility. 
We should contrast this with agricultural systems in other Middle Eastern environments. In the 
rain-fed, dry-farming environments of the coastal plains of Syria and Palestine, or further inland on 
the hills of the Massif Calcaire, the Hawran or the mountains of Moab, agriculture can never be as 
productive as it can be in Mesopotamia. On the other hand it is much less vulnerable to financial 
and political stress. No investment is needed to bring the rain, though small-scale ditches and dams 
may help to distribute it more usefully. These areas can support subsistence farming at periods when 
outside markets are stagnant or dying. In cases of prolonged disruption, the population has the 
option of shifting the emphasis of their agricultural endeavours to pastoralism. 
Or consider the pre-High Dam agriculture of the Nile Valley in Egypt. This was of course 
absolutely dependent on the rise and fall of the river. A good Nile flood would bring prosperity and 
abundant food, a poor Nile would result in starvation and misery, but no amount of money or 
government intervention could influence the height of the river. Equally a bad year could easily be 
followed by a good. In the canal-based agricultural systems of Mesopotamia, the destruction of a 
major canal might take years to repair, during which time the inhabitants might move elsewhere or 
revert to the more secure economic refuge of a nomadic lifestyle. 
As Adams noted, the late Sasanian period saw the expansion of the agricultural area to the 
maximum that physical geography and existing irrigation techniques would allow: despite the 
settlement of many Arab Muslim troops and the emergence of new urban communities after the 
Islamic conquest, there is no evidence of the subsequent expansion of agriculture and settlement in 
such well-established farming environments as the Diyala basin.7 
There was one area in which the trauma of the Islamic conquests seems to have had a direct 
impact on the landscape and that was the Bata'ih or marshes of southern Iraq. According to 
5
 For an overview of the irrigation landscapes of Iraq, and Land Use on the Central Floodplain of the Euphrates 
T. J. Wilkinson, Agricultural Landscapes of the Near East (Chicago, 1981). For a general overview of agricultural practice 
(Tucson, 2003) 71-99. For the agricultural environment based on textual sources, H. Q. El-Samarraie, Agriculture in 
of the Diyala basin in the pre-modern period see R. McC. Iraq in the Third Century A.H. (Beirut, 1972). 
Adams, The Land behind Baghdad (Chicago, 1965) 3-20; also 6 See H. Kennedy, "The decline and fall of the first 
R. McC. Adams and H. J. Nissen, The Uruk Countryside: the Muslim empire", Der Islam 81 (2004) 3-30 at pp. 11-12. 
Natural Setting of'Urban Societies (Chicago, 1972) and R. McC. 7 Adams, Land behind Baghdad 69-83. 
Adams, Heartland of Cities: Surveys of Ancient Settlement 
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al-Baladhuri,8 who gives the fullest account to be found in the Arabic sources, the marshes were first 
formed in the reign of the Sasanian Shah Kubadh (488-531) when the Tigris burst its banks and 
large areas of fertile land were flooded. Kubadh, the historian says, was too feeble to do anything 
about it, but when his son Khusraw I Anushirvan (531-79) succeeded he ordered that the dykes 
(musannahat sing, musannah) be restored and some of the land was brought back under cultivation. 
Then in the time of Khusraw II (591-628), towards the end of his long reign, the waters of the Tigris 
and Euphrates rose higher than they had ever done before or since and numerous breeches were 
made in the banks. The king struggled to block the gaps up, filling forty in one day. He also brought 
money and spent it extravagantly but his efforts were in vain against the water. In the years of chaos 
which immediately preceded the Arab invasions the Persians were too busy fighting to block up the 
breaches and anyway, with the collapse of the central power, the local dihqans lacked the resources 
to undertake such major work. 
The Umayyad caliph Mucawiya b. Abi Sufyan (41-60/661-80) decided to take action and 
appointed a mawla9 of his, cAbd Allah b. Darraj, to reclaim the flooded land, and he restored land 
which generated a revenue (ghalla) of five million dirhams per year. Later on al-Hajjaj is said to have 
neglected the maintenance of the rivers as a move against the dihqans,10 whom he suspected of 
sympathizing with the rebel leader Ibn al-Ashcath. Some years after Ibn al-Ashcath's revolt had been 
put down in 82/701, al-Hajjaj wrote to the caliph al-Walld b. cAbd al-Malik saying three million 
dirhams were required to repair the breaches. Al-Walld thought that was too much but his brother 
Maslama b. cAbd al-Malik, who was always on the look-out for economic opportunities, agreed to 
put up the money if he could have any low-lying land which was still flooded as a qatVa. He thus 
gained possession of a number of districts which lay beside each other and dug a canal known as 
al-Sibayn to drain the land. Farmers and sharecroppers then entrusted their lands to him because of 
his prestige.11 
There were, however, marginal areas which could be brought under cultivation, if the economic 
conditions were favourable, with the investment of large sums of money in irrigation schemes. 
Among these areas were the Middle Euphrates valley12 and the valleys of its tributaries, the Khabur 
and Balikh.13 These were areas where settlement had been very sparse in Late Antiquity, not least 
because they lay in the disturbed and ravaged areas between the Byzantine and Sasanian empires. 
Another area which could be developed in very favourable circumstances was the lands in the desert 
areas which surrounded the Islamic new town of Basra to the west of the Shatt al-Arab. In the early 
Islamic period (c. 640-900 CE) these areas showed a richness of cultivation and an intensity of rural 
settlement seen neither before nor since. 
River transport 
The second important factor was the use of river transport. There is no detailed description of 
river transport and, as often, we have to rely on anecdotal evidence to piece together a picture of 
river transport during this period.14 Texts make it clear that river boats were a normal way of 
moving both people and goods. For example, in 184/800 the cAbbasid caliph Harun al-Rashld came 
to Baghdad, travelling there from Raqqa on the Euphrates "in ships" (fi'l-sufuri)}5 In 187/803 we 
find Harun in a boat (zaw) on the Euphrates at al-cUmr, planning the fall of the Barmakids.16 There 
8
 Ahmad b. Yahya al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-bulddn, ed. M. J. Bartl, "Balih Valley Survey. Settlements of the late Roman/ 
deGoeje (Leiden, 1866) 292-93. early Byzantine and Islamic period" in Continuity and 
9
 mawla (pi. mawalt) in this period means a non-Arab Change in Northern Mesopotamia from the Hellenistic to the 
Muslim, usually attached as a client to an Arab individual or Early Islamic Period, ed. K. Bartl and S. Hauser (Berlin, 
tribe. 1996) 333-48. On the Khabur, H. Kiihne, " Zur historischen 
10
 Landowners, mostly of Iranian origin. Geographie am Unteren Habur", Archivfiir Orientforschung 
11
 al-Baladhuri, Futuh 294. 26 (1979) 181-95. 
12
 For agriculture in the Middle Euphrates valley, S. 14 For a further discussion of the importance of river 
Berthier et al., Peuplement rural et amenagements hydroagri- transport for the supply of the new city of Baghdad, see 
coles dans la moyenne vallee de I'Euphrate, fin VII'-XIX" below. 
siecle (Damascus, 2001). 15 Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari, Ta'rikh al-rusul wa'l-
13
 On the Balikh valley, see K. Bartl, Friihislamische muluk, ed. M. J. deGoeje et al. (Leiden, 1879-1901) hi 649. 
Besiedlung im Balih-TallNordsyrien (Berlin, 1994) and K. 16 al-Tabari, Ta'rikh iii 682. 
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is also evidence of ports: according to the geographer al-Istakhn, Balis was the "port (furda) of the 
people of Syria on the Euphrates".17 At Qarqisiya the fruits from the town and from the Khabur 
valley were collected for shipping to Iraq in the winter.18 According to Yaqut, the Khabur from Ra's 
al-cAyn to the Euphrates at Qarqisiya had at one time been used for navigation. People had used 
small zawarlq or sufun to visit their gardens and orchards along the river bank.19 
Another insight into the importance of river transport on the Euphrates can be found in the 
account of the founding of the city of Rahba.20 Rahba was a new town founded during the reign of 
Harun al-Rashld by a Bedouin chief turned property-developer by the name of Malik b. Tawq 
al-Taghlibl. A rahba is described as a low-lying area overlooked by higher ground, often with 
stagnant water in it, which can be made very fertile. According to an old man from Rahba the story 
of its foundation went like this: 
Harun al-Rashld was travelling along the Euphrates in a harrdqa before reaching a shadhd." With him were 
some boon-companions, including Malik b. Tawq. When they were approaching the water-wheels Malik 
said, "O Commander of the Faithful, why not get out on to the shore to get by this spot (buqca)T' and 
Harun al-Rashld said to him, "I think you are afraid of these water-wheels," so Malik b. Tawq replied, 
"May God preserve the Commander of the Faithful from every danger. But if the Commander of the 
Faithful agrees (then he should do it). If not, the choice is his," and al-Rashid said, "Your words have 
frightened me," so he brought the ship (sqfina) alongside and got up on to the shore. When the boat 
reached the place of the waterwheels it spun around and then overturned with everything that was in it. 
Harun was amazed by this and prostrated himself to God in thanks and ordered that money be brought 
and given to the poor everywhere, and he said to Malik, "Ask what you want and it will be done for you," 
and Malik replied, "May the Commander of the Faithful give me in this place some land on which I can 
build a city which will be named after me. Harun replied, "I have already done it," and ordered that he be 
helped in the construction with money and men. 
The anecdote goes on to tell the story of how Malik was almost executed for defying the caliph 
but saved his life by the recitation of a suitable and moving poem, but what is interesting here is that 
the story shows the use of the river for transportation and irrigation. Malik wants to build his city 
by the river on land which can be irrigated. The site of Rahba is well known and the cAbbasid-period 
city did indeed lie beside the river in a place with no natural fortifications. River access and fertile 
land were Malik's priorities. In the eleventh or twelfth centuries the riverside site was effectively 
abandoned and the habitation moved to a less exposed site on the edge of the desert escarpment, and 
a magnificent castle, whose ruins still dominate the area today, was constructed. 
The Tigris was also used for river trade. Ibn Hawqal describes Jazirat Ibn Umar (modern Cizre) 
as the "port (furda) of Armenia, the Byzantine lands and the districts of Mayyafariqin and Arzan, 
and boats (mardkib) go from there to Mosul laden with goods like honey, cooking-butter (samri), 
cheese, walnuts, almonds, hazelnuts, raisins and figs."22 
The river systems to the south of Baghdad were equally important for transportation. Numerous 
anecdotes make it clear that boats were the normal way of moving people and goods between Basra, 
Wasit and Baghdad. Again, most of our information comes from anecdotal sources. Consider the 
career of the great tax-farmer, Hamid b. al-cAbbas, during the caliphate of al-Muqtadir (295-
320/908-32). His wealth derived from his tax farms in the Wasit area, but it was the availability of 
water transport that meant he could bring provisions to Baghdad and enabled him to become an 
important figure in the caliphate. He had storehouses in Baghdad where grain could be kept until 
the price was high enough, when it was sold at the harbour (furda) on the river.23 When he travelled 
from Wasit to Baghdad, "he signalled his departure by trumpet blast. Then he made all his retainers 
17
 Ibrahim b. Muhammad al-Istakhrl, al-Masdlik wa'l- Bulletin d'etudes orientales 41-42 (1993) 23-52. 
mamdlik, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1927) 62. Again, most 21 Two types of boats in regular use in the early cAbbasid 
of our information comes from anecdotal sources. period, the harrdqa being smaller than the more barge-like 
18
 Abfl'l-Qasim Ibn Hawqal, Kitab surat al-ard, ed. J. H. shadhd. 
Kramers (Leiden, 1939) 227. 22 Ibn Hawqal, Sural al-ard 225. 
19
 Yaqut al-Hamawi, Muljam al-bulddn s.v. Ra's al-cAyn. 23 Abu CA1T Miskawayh, Tajarib al-umam, ed. H. F. 
20
 For the archaeology and early history of the site, T. Amedroz and D. S. Margoliouth (London, 1921) i 74-75, 
Bianquis, "Rahba et les tribus arabes avant les croisades", 100. 
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and dependents embark in launches and barges . . . his horses and those of his attendants and 
followers being led on the bank."24 
The fiscal system 
The third element in the compound was the fiscal system of the early Islamic state.25 This is not 
the place to give a full account of this system but some main points can be emphasized. In the 
immediate aftermath of the conquest of Iraq, the incoming Arab-Muslim soldiers were concentrated 
in a small number of urban settlements rather than allowed to disperse through the agricultural 
lands of the Sawad.26 This entailed the abandonment of their pastoral or agricultural lifestyles, and 
the settlers came to depend for their subsistence on a cash cata paid by the state once or twice a year. 
Originally there were also some payments in kind (oil, wheat etc.) known as rizq, but by the beginning 
of the second/eighth century at the latest these payments had all been replaced by cash. The salaries 
were usually paid in urban centres where the soldiers and others entitled to them were registered in 
the diwan. Such cities were known as misr (pi. amsar). The effect of this was to create a large class of 
urban, salaried individuals with money to spend on basic foodstuffs and a regular and reliable 
demand for agricultural products. As noted above, evidence suggests that the population of Basra 
had reached 250,000 within a generation of the conquest and the establishment of the city. All these 
people would need to eat at least once a day and many of them had money to pay for their food: a 
massive market was created. The foundation of Baghdad by the cAbbasid caliph al-Mansur in 
145/762 intensified this process, for the Khurasani troops from eastern Iran who had brought the 
dynasty to power, as well as other elements of the military and the bureaucracy, were settled in the 
city and paid cash salaries. With its huge population, the Baghdad of the third/ninth century 
generated a massive demand, whose gravitational pull was felt throughout the area of Greater 
Mesopotamia and beyond. 
Landholding 
The fourth and final element in this virtuous circle was the development of the qatfa (pi. qata'f)21 
as a form of landholding.28 Again, this is not the place for a complex discussion of this institution 
but a few points might be emphasized. The qatfa was developed by early Islamic legal authorities to 
regularize the private ownership of landed estates and properties. The nature of the settlement of the 
Arab-Muslims in the conquered lands led to the argument that the cultivated lands in these areas 
should remain in the possession of those who were already cultivating them, but that the yield of 
these properties should be considered as the fay' of the Muslims in that area, a communal resource 
which should be held for the benefit of all. The jurist Abu Yusuf explained the situation, "cUmar's29 
decision not to distribute the land amongst those who had captured it was guided by God's book 
and was of benefit to all Muslims. The taxes collected from such lands enabled the payment of 
pensions and wages from this perpetual income, thus making the wars of jihad possible and providing 
security against the recapture of their lands and places by enemies."30 
There was, however, a continuing demand for private property from rich and powerful men in 
the early Islamic state. Early Islamic law was nothing if not creative in its approach to solving 
problems and by the early Umayyad period the qatfa had emerged as a legal framework for private 
landholding. The idea underlying the concept of qatfa was that dead land (mawat), brought under 
cultivation usually by irrigation but also by drainage or the clearing of brush, should become the 
24
 Miskawayh, Tajarib i 94-95. literature and no entry in the Encyclopaedia of Islam. For the 
25
 For a fuller development of this argument, H. Kennedy, classic discussion of the fiscal status of qafa'f, Abu Yusuf, 
"Military pay and the economy of the early Islamic state", Kitdb al-Kharaj trans. A. Ben Shemesh (Leiden, 1969) 73-77, 
Historical Research 75 (2002) 155-69. and Abu cUbayd al-Qasim Ibn Sallam (d. 223 AH), Kitdb 
26
 On the earliest Arab military settlement in Iraq, al-Amwdl, ed.M.K. Haras (Cairo, 1975), English trans. I. A. 
Morony, Iraq 236-53. K. Nyazee, The Book of Revenue (Reading, 2002) paras. 
27
 qafi "a is frequently translated as "fief, e.g. by P. Hitti in 676-727. See also below, the discussion ofqafa'F in the Basra 
his translation of al-Baladhun's Futuh al-bulddn and A. Ben area, which shows how the system could work in practice. 
Shemesh, Abu Yusuf s Kitab al-kharaj, but a fief, meaning a 29 cUmar b. al-Khattab, second caliph, 13-23/634-44. 
conditional or time-limited grant, is precisely what it is not. 30 Abu Yusuf, Kitdb al-kharaj 68. 
28
 There is very little discussion of qaffa in the secondary 
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property of the person or persons who had made it productive. It was held in absolute ownership 
and was alienable (it could be sold) and heritable. 
Although there remained some discussion about the tax status of such property, it was generally 
held that it should pay the tithe (cushr) rather than the higher kharaj (land-tax) paid on most 
agricultural land. As Abu Yusuf notes, "cushr only is charged on qata'f when the granted lands 
require investment for digging canals, erecting farm buildings and other heavy expenses for the 
farming of the granted qafTa."31 Such qataic were developed by people rich enough to invest 
substantial funds in making the land productive. The qatfa gave the landowner security of tenure 
which would give him the confidence to develop the land. These tax-breaks, combined with the 
regular and consistent demand for foodstuffs from developing urban centres, made investing in 
agricultural development a very attractive proposition. We shall see below how the device of the 
qatfa played a major role in developing the food supply of Basra, and there is less clear, but still 
persuasive evidence, that it was important in the feeding of Baghdad as well. 
After the consideration of these general trends I would like to turn now to two areas in which, I 
believe, the interaction of textual and archaeological evidence can show how these systems worked 
in practice. The first of these is the agricultural hinterland of the Muslim new town of Basra in the 
south of Iraq, and the second is the lands of the Middle Euphrates and its tributaries, the Khabur 
and the Balikh, which supplied Baghdad. 
Basra32 
Despite some evidence of minor Sasanian settlement in the area, Basra was essentially an Islamic 
new town founded, it is said, by cUtba b. Ghazwan in 17/638 to house the Arab army, which was 
then engaged in the conquest of southern Iraq, Khuzistan and Fars. The reasons for the choice of 
this particular site are obscure. It lay some fifteen kilometres from the Shatt al-Arab and therefore 
had no direct access to the maritime trade of the Gulf; the pre-Islamic port of Ubulla (ancient 
Apologos) on the banks of the river would seem to have been a much more logical location for the 
new settlement. Neither the textual nor the archaeological records suggest that the city when founded 
had an extensive agricultural hinterland. Furthermore, it clearly lacked adequate and reliable 
supplies of drinking water. 
Despite these apparent disadvantages, the role of the city as a misr where salaries were paid to the 
troops meant that the financial drawing-power of the settlement proved sufficient, at least for a 
couple of centuries, to overcome the natural disadvantages of the situation. As we have seen, the 
population seems to have grown very rapidly. All these people had to be fed, and human ingenuity 
and investment had to compensate for the natural disadvantages of the site. 
The result was a major campaign of investment in new irrigation projects in the land between the 
city and the Shatt al-Arab, which is described in considerable detail in al-Baladhurl's Futuh al-
buldan.33 This account, which has barely been studied by historians, is of very great importance. It 
is the only account we have from Iraq of property ownership and land development in the first 
century of Islam. From a legal-historical point of view, it expands on and largely corroborates the 
legal texts on the nature of qatfa grants. From an economic-historical angle, it shows how the 
existence of the new town encouraged a new class of entrepreneurs to invest in large-scale agricultural 
entrerprises. As usual in classical Arabic historiography, the argument is advanced by means of 
anecdote and oratory. According to one story, al-Ahnaf b. Qays explained to the caliph cUmar b. 
al-Khattab that, while Muslim settlers in other areas were established in already cultivated areas 
with "sweet waters and luxuriant gardens", the people of Basra only had "reedy sabkha (salt marsh) 
31
 Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-khardj 73. 33 For an important discussion of al-Baladhurl's text on 
32
 L. Massignon, "Explication du plan de Basra" in West- the development of the Basra region, Wadad al-Qadi, "The 
ostliche Abhandungen R. Tschudi (Wiesbaden, 1954) 154-74; names of estates in the state registers before and after the 
Salih al-'Ali, "Khitat al-Basra", Sumer 8 (1952) 72-83, 281- Arabization of the diwans" in Umayyad Legacies: Medieval 
303; C. Pellat, Le milieu basrien et la formation de Gahiz Memories from Syria to Spain, ed. A. Borrut and P. Cobb 
(Paris, 1953). (Leiden, 2010) 255-80. 
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which never dries up and where pasture never grows, bounded on the east by brackish (ujaj) water 
and on the west by waterless desert (afla). We have no cultivation or stock farming to provide us 
with our livelihood and food, which comes to us as through the throat of an ostrich.34 If a weak man 
goes out to find drinking water he has to go for two farsakhs. If a woman goes to fetch it, she has to 
tie up her children by the neck, as goats are tied up, for fear of being attacked by enemies or eaten 
by lions. If you do not take away our misery and end our destitution, we shall all perish." 
According to the narrative, this finely crafted piece of rhetoric had its effect: the caliph ordered 
that the people of Basra should be paid the cata and wrote to the governor, Abu Musa al-AshcarI, 
ordering him to dig a canal (nahr).35 Despite its anecdotal character, the story makes important 
points. The provision of water required the digging of canals and was linked to the payment of the 
c
afa. The alleged involvement of the caliph in person is characteristic of such anecdotes, showing 
that the great cUmar himself regarded the provision of water as part of the function of 
government. 
The digging of canals was very expensive. A canal to bring drinking-water from the BatTha 
marshes to Basra was estimated to cost 300,000 dirhams, but the project was deemed to be so 
important that the governor who was sponsoring it said that he would, if necessary, use all the tax 
revenues of Iraq on it. There is some indication that black Zanj slaves were beginning to be used for 
development projects in this area and minor Zanj revolts are recorded in 70/689-90 and 75/694.36 
The buying, feeding and managing of large numbers of slaves would certainly have been expensive 
but it is more likely that most of the labour was done by free men serving for wages. In either case, 
the digging of irrigation canals was a very substantial investment and such investment could only be 
made in the expectation of a reliable return. This could only have been obtained from the market 
for food in Basra. Major projects, especially the provision of drinking-water, were sometimes 
undertaken by governors, but in the majority of cases the land was assigned by the governor but the 
initiative and investment seem to have come from private individuals and families, who no doubt 
regarded such enterprise as a good investment for themselves and their descendants. 
In the following pages, al-Baladhurl gives much detailed information about the digging of 
canals.37 Abu Musa dug what became known as the Ubulla canal from the Shatt al-Arab to Basra. 
Maintenance of these watercourses was a constant struggle and much of Abu Musa's canal had to 
be re-excavated by Ziyad b. AbT Sufyan, the governor during the reign of the caliph Uthman b. 
cAffan (23-35/644-56). At the same time, cUmar ordered Abu Musa to dig the Macqil canal, though 
other traditions suggest, plausibly, that it was constructed by Ziyad b. AbT Sufyan in the reign of 
Mulwiya. The Macqil canal led water from the Euphrates to the town and allowed boats with 
supplies from the rest of the Sawad to reach the city, while to the south the Ubulla canal connected 
it with the Shatt al-Arab. These important civil-engineering projects not only provided water for the 
city but also allowed boats carrying goods and provisions to reach it. 
The obligation of the government to provide drinking-water is confirmed in an anecdote set at 
the end of the Umayyad period in the reign of the caliph YazTd b. al-WalTd (126/744). The citizens 
of Basra approached the governor of Iraq complaining that their water was salty. They presented 
him with two samples in glass bottles (qaruratayri), one containing water of Basra and the other 
water from the BatTha marshes further to the north, and asked that he dig a canal so that they could 
have the sweet BatTha water to drink. The governor wrote to the caliph explaining the problem and 
YazTd wrote back saying that a canal should be dug "even if the expense of this canal is equal to all 
the tax revenues we receive from Iraq".38 Even this did not solve the problem because the new canal 
just delivered a meagre trickle, and complaints about the salty water led the cAbbasid governor, 
Sulayman b. cAlT, to spend a million dirhams on dams to direct more water into the new canal.39 
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The Macqil and Ubulla canals provided the framework of Basra's connection with the waterways 
of Iraq but they were followed by numerous other, smaller-scale projects. The reasons for this burst 
of activity were various. Canal developments were often named after the developer who had them 
dug and the resultant prestige and reputation were certainly important. When cAbd Allah b. cAmir 
returned from campaigning in Khurasan to find that his deputy in Basra, Ziyad, had restored the 
Ubulla canal, he was furious, accusing Ziyad of wanting the fame and reputation (shahr and dhikr) 
which he would have earned.40 But Ziyad also lost out. He was largely responsible for the excavation 
of the Macqil canal but the canal became known after the eponymous Macqil, whose connection with 
the project was very tenuous. The narrative describes how Ziyad sent a man with a thousand dirhams 
to travel the length of the watercourse and ask everyone he met who was the sahib of the canal and 
give the money to anyone who said "Ziyad". As he feared, the man came back with the money 
unspent and Ziyad knew he had lost the battle,41 and, indeed, the modern port of Basra is known to 
this day as Macqil, while the great Ziyad is nowhere commemorated in the place names of the area. 
There were more tangible benefits to be derived from the digging of canals. As one contemporary 
observed when visiting Ibn cAmir, who had just opened a new canal, "I have not seen any canal 
which is more of a blessing (baraka) than this one. The weak are able to get water out of it at the 
doors of their houses and their food supplies are brought to their homes."42 
The passage brings out two important reasons for the digging of canals. One was the providing 
of water for domestic purposes (and also, presumably, for ablutions in the mosques and for the 
baths of the city). But the most important reason was to bring land into cultivation. Repeatedly, the 
process is described as the granting of a qaffa and the digging of a canal. cAbd Allah b. cAmir, for 
example, gave his half-brother cAbd Allah b. cUmayr an estate of eight thousand jaribs "and dug for 
it the canal which is known as the Nahr Ibn cUmayr".43 When Bashshar b. Muslim al-Bahill gave 
al-flajjaj a particularly fine carpet, the governor gave him an estate "and dug this canal (Nahr 
Bahshsar) for it".44 Proper drainage could dramatically increase the value of a property. The "island" 
which lay between the Macqil and Ubulla canals was at first largely sabkha. At one stage the caliph 
Mulwiya gave part of this area to one of his nephews as a qatfa. When the gilded youth arrived to 
inspect his new possession, the crafty Ziyad arranged for it to be flooded. When the Umayyad saw 
it he said, "the Commander of the Faithful has given me a marsh (bafiha) which is no use to me." 
Ziyad bought it from him for 200,000 dirhams, dug canals in it and made it into qafa'f (aqtaca 
minha). Whether he then sold off the qataf or gave them as rewards to family and supporters is not 
stated but the whole deal was clearly thought to be very advantageous.45 
The canal could become the centre of a more urban development: when Bilal b. Burda dug the 
canal which bore his name, he set up shops (hawamt) on both sides of it and transferred the siiq 
there.46 Fish may have been another source of profit from canals for two of the newly dug waterways 
were known after the types of fish to be found in them.47 One canal was known as the Canal of the 
Mills,48 while the Canal of Dubays was named after a man who used the water for fulling cloth (he 
is described as a qassdr).49 
This process of investment was encouraged by the nature of landholding in the area. The newly 
irrigated areas were almost all held as qataf. They were held as qatfa because they were on previously 
dead land which was brought into cultivation by the digging of irrigation canals. It was a condition 
of holding a qatfa that it was developed: Ziyad is said to have made this explicit by declaring to one 
grantee, "I have only granted (anfahdu) what you have cultivated (cammaratum)." Al-Mada'inI then 
goes on to explain, "he would give a man a qatfa and allow him two years and if he brought it under 
cultivation (he could keep it) but if not, he would take it away."50 In short, if you wanted to have a 
qatfa, you had to irrigate it or you would lose it. 
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The doctrine that whoever irrigated the land owned it was occasionally put to the test. In one case 
a certain BashTr b. cUbayd Allah irrigated an area of land, digging a main canal, ditches (sawaqi) and 
cross-canals (muctaridat) in order to take possession of the land. The only problem was that it was 
actually owned by someone else, Hilal b. Ahwaz al-Mazini, who had been given the land, all eight 
thousand jaribs of it, as a qatta by the caliph YazTd b. Mucawiya (60-64/680-83). His son al-Himyar! 
then brought a law-suit against BashTr (khdsamahu). He was in luck: BashTr had criticized the 
governor of Iraq, Khalid b. cAbd Allah al-Qasn, for wrongdoing and Khalid had heard about it. 
Rather than asking the qadito adjudicate, Khalid wrote to the man in charge of the afrdath of Basra, 
ordering him to give al-Himyan a free hand over the newly dug canal.51 In another case YazTd b. 
al-Muhallab dug a canal on a qatTa belonging to cUbayd Allah b. AbT Bakra and tried to pressure 
cUbayd Allah's son into writing a deed (kitdb) acknowledging his rights over the watercourse, but 
the son refused and threatened to take him to court.52 
Once they had been granted, qatd'T were held in absolute ownership. They could be swapped, 
sold or inherited. One anecdote makes the hereditary nature of this tenure explicit. In it the caliph 
YazTd b. cAbd al-Malik (101-5/720^1) realizes that he has no property in the area and orders his 
governor of Iraq, cUmar b. Hubayra, to go there and take any of the qatd'T which are left over 
(fudul). The governor duly went there and began investigating and measuring the estates. When he 
came to one property and asked to whom it belonged, the owner (sahib) replied, "to me". When 
asked why it was his he responded with a couplet of poetry, 
We inherited it from our true fathers 
And shall bequeath it when we die to our sons. 
Eventually, the scale of the opposition among the qatTa holders forced cUmar to abandon the 
project.53 
Further evidence for the hereditary nature of the qatTa is to be found in the story of the estate 
known originally as Muhallaban,54 belonging to al-MughTra, son of the great Muhallab b. AbT 
Sufra. Like the rest of the family's property it had been confiscated after the fall of YazTd b. al-
Muhallab (102/720). With the coming of cAbbasid rule, it was restored to Sufyan b. Mucawiya b. 
YazTd al-Muhallab but his claim was challenged by other members of the family. They brought a 
case against him (khdsamahu), claiming that al-MughTra had died before his father. Half of the estate 
was inherited by his daughter, Sufyan's mother, but, under Islamic law, the other half reverted to his 
father. The claimants were prepared to accept Sufyan's right to inherit his mother's half but argued 
that the rest of the estate (i.e. the portion which had reverted to al-Muhallab) should rightfully be 
theirs. Sufyan retorted that al-MughTra had a son as well but the claimants pointed out that he had 
no rights over this portion because the son was only his maternal uncle. Sufyan, now a powerful man 
in the service of the cAbbasids, was able to brush their claims aside, refusing to give them any part 
of the 1,600 jarib estate, and his family still owned the land at the time when al-Baladhuri was writing 
(c. 290/902). The importance of this story for our purposes does not lie in the detail of the inheritance 
dispute, which is not entirely clear, but in the unequivocal evidence that the qatTa was regarded as 
a bit of property which should be inherited and, if necessary, divided up among the heirs.55 
The text also provides direct evidence of the selling of qatd'T. Dhat al-Hifafayn, for example, was 
sold by cAbd al-Rahman b. AbT Bakra, who was said to have been the first child to be born in Basra 
after the settlement of the site,56 to cArabT al-Tammar, mawld of his sister Amat- Allah.57 The property 
known as Shatt cUthman was named after cUthman b. AbT'l cAs al-Thaqafi, who had bought it from 
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the caliph cUthman b. cAffan with some wealth he had in Taif or, others said, in exchange for a house 
in Madina which the caliph wished to incorporate in the mosque.58 
One advantage of this was that the owners ofqata'T enjoyed a favourable tax regime. As long as 
the lands were "dead" (mawdt) and not subject to existing fiscal obligations, they could pay the 
much lower sadaqa (cushr) rate. In the case of Basra, the key text is the letter59 alleged to have been 
written by the caliph cUmar b. al-Khattab to al-Mughlra b. Shucba, governor of Basra, enjoining him 
to give a qatTa to one Abu cAbd Allah Nafic b. Harith, who had sown (zarcfa) some land beside the 
Tigris in the area of Basra and raised horses there. He was to be allowed possession of the land as 
long as it was not subject to existing taxation (jizya) of the land of the Persians (al-acajim) or supplied 
with water from land which was paying taxes. The use of the word jizya is significant here. It is 
clearly used to mean the land-tax which would later be known in Islamic law as kharaj, and its use 
in this context suggests that the document is genuinely archaic. It also suggests that the early Muslims 
in this area were simply taking over Persian land classifications. The word qatTa is not used here; the 
governor is simply ordered to let Nafic have possession of the land and to help him, but the principle 
that someone who brings land under cultivation should have possession of it is clearly enunciated. 
Elsewhere in the text it is clearly stated that the grant was a qatTa and that it was one of only two 
qata'T granted in Basra by the caliph cUmar b. al-Khattab, the other one being given to Abu Bakra. 
There seem, however, to have been some exceptions to this benign fiscal regime. The Nahr Jafar 
belonging to Jacfar, mawla of Salm b. Ziyad, is specifically described as kharajiyan, that is, liable to 
kharaj tax. Why this should have been so is not stated and it was clearly regarded as an 
exception.60 
Most of the canals and qata'T are named after individuals and take the form of Nahr Fulan or 
Fulanan. The survival of these names in al-Baladhurl's work enables us to develop a profile of the 
landowning class in the Basra area in the first century and a half of Muslim rule. According to the 
author the first canal was dug to Basra by Abu Musa al-AshcarI on the instructions of the caliph 
cUmar, but this left no trace in the toponymy of the area and it may be no more than a pious legend. 
The first major wave of development was undertaken during the governorates of cAbd Allah b. 
cAmir (29/649-50 until 35/656 and 41/661 until 44/664). cAbd Allah certainly enriched his family as 
well as himself, giving his half-brother cAbd Allah b. cUmayr, as we have seen, an enormous qatTa 
of eight thousand jaribs, the largest recorded in the Basra area.61 The most important figure in this 
campaign was Ibn c Amir's deputy and successor, Ziyad b. Abl Sufyan (45/665-53/673). It seems to 
have been he who completed the Macqil and Ubulla Canals, which were the backbone of the Basra 
system. Not surprisingly, his relatives and mawalT were among the beneficiaries of his activity. His 
son Abu Bakra owned property and there was a special qatTa called al-Banat which belonged to his 
daughters.62 His daughter Umm HabTb had a canal named after her.63 Important properties were 
also owned by his sahib al-shurta (chief of police), Makhul, and two of his mawalT, FTl and 
Mismar.64 
Another family which benefited were the descendants of Abu Bakra Nufayc b. Masruh (died c. 
52/672), a former slave from Taif who had famously let himself down from the city wall on a pulley 
{bakra, hence, allegedly, his unusual name) to join Muhammad and achieve his freedom. He had 
been one of the first settlers in Basra, and he and his seven sons became rich from their ownership 
of baths in the city and powerful from their close relationship with Ziyad. It was cAbd al-Rahman b. 
Abl Bakra who was in charge of engineering the extension of the Ubulla canal to Basra. When he 
broke the dam to allow the water into the new canal, he galloped his horse beside the flowing water 
and it advanced almost faster than he could ride.65 cAbd al-Rahman also inherited the qatTa of al-
Jamum from his father,66 and his brother cUbayd Allah owned the qatTa of cUbaydallan67 and 
Suwaydan, named after a man to whom he gave it.68 In the next generation, his son Salm b. cUbayd 
58
 al-Baladhurl, Futuh 362. 
59
 al-Baladhuri, Futuh 351. 
60
 al-BaladhurJ, Futuh 367. 
61
 al-Baladhurl, Futuh 359. 
62
 al-Baladhurl, Futuh 361, 
63
 al-Baladhurl, Futuh 358. 
363. 
64
 al-Baladhurl, Futuh 362, 364. 
65
 al-Baladhuri, Futuh 357. 
66
 al-Baladhuri, Futuh 362. 
67
 al-Baladhurl, Futuh 362. 
68
 al-Baladhurl, Futuh 365. 
THE FEEDING OF THE FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND 187 
Allah had the canal known as Nahr Salm but under the early cAbbasids the fortunes of the family 
declined somewhat. Al-Mansur confiscated some of their properties and in 160/776-77 al-Mahdl 
rejected their pretensions to an Arab genealogy but accepted their claims to be mawdli of the Prophet, 
adding that all those who accepted this reclassification would be entitled to a share of the family's 
property in Basra, while those who did not would be excluded. Not surprisingly, all except three 
accepted the judgment, a genealogical humiliation in exchange for property.69 The story illustrates 
how the property remained in family hands for at least a century and a half after Abu Bakra originally 
developed it. 
Other important Basran families owned qata'i0 in the area, notably the Muhallabis and the family 
of the conqueror of Transoxania, Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bahili, who owned the Qutaybatan.70 But 
there were also numerous less prominent Arab families from Basra which had one of more canals or 
qata'f named after them. These presumably form the group which al-Baladhuri refers to as the elite 
(sarah sing, sari or ashraf sing, sharif) of Basra.71 We also find women owning such properties, 
apparently in their own right. One such was the already mentioned Umm HabTb b. Ziyad. cAbd 
Allah b. cAmir had a canal called the Nahr Umm cAbd Allah Dajjaja dug and named it after his 
mother,72 and another canal was named after his daughter-in-law, Humayda, wife of his son cAbd 
al-cAziz.73 
There were also a number of mawdliwho developed their own properties: Fayruz, mawla of Banu 
ThaqTf who dug Nahr Fayruz, Azraq b. Muslim, a mawla of Banu Hanlfa who owned Azraqan, 
Ziyad, mawla of Banu Haytham who owned Ziyadan and others.74 There were other groups of 
non-Arabs. The Asawira, Persian elite soldiers who had defected to the Muslims at the time of the 
conquests, are credited with developing a canal known as Nahr Asawira, apparently in partnership 
with cAbd Allah b. cAmir.75 Alongside them was a group of Isfahanis who migrated to Basra and 
purchased land from some of the Arabs there, probably converting to Islam at the time.76 
The chronology of this economic development is fairly clear from al-Baladhuri's account. There 
is only one reference to pre-Islamic irrigation works in the area, a canal and a qasr belonging to 
al-Nucman b. al-Mundhir, the last King of Hira (580-602), which had been given to him as a qaffa 
in the days of Kisra (i.e. the late Sasanian period). Significantly, it seems to have been situated on 
the banks of the Tigris, not in the immediate vicinity of new Islamic Basra.77 The development began 
extremely rapidly after the first settlement of Islamic Basra. It would seem that the major irrigation 
works had been completed by the death of Ziyad b. Abl Sufyan in about 53/674. New developments 
continued to be undertaken at a slower pace throughout the Umayyad period as families like the 
Muhallabids and the family of Qutayba b. Muslim sought to consolidate their position in the city. 
The early cAbbasid period saw some new works. Al-Mansur's mawla Abu'l-KhasTb gave his name to 
a canal and al-Mansiir himself is explicity said to have dug a canal which became known as the canal 
of the Amir (al-Mu'mihfn). Sulayman b. cAli, cAbbasid governor of Basra, also undertook some new 
works.78 These seem to have been the last projects of their sort and there is no further evidence for 
those individual and family initiatives which had driven so much of the earlier investment in 
irrigation. Al-Rashld and the Barmakids certainly owned property in the area,79 but there is no 
record of further development. No new qatat are recorded after the end of the Umayyad period and 
this form of landowning gradually became extinct. 
This intensive agricultural activity has left significant traces in the archaeological record. In the 
early 1960s, a very distinctive irrigation landscape was detected to the south and west of the modern 
city of Basra.80 The system occupied an enormous area of some 57,000 hectares lying between the 
old westerly course of the Euphrates, now completely abandoned, and the Shatt al-Arab. In 1962 
just eight thousand of these hectares were used for the cultivation of date-palms along the Shatt 
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al-Arab: the rest had reverted to desert. The area is characterized by a regular pattern of low, straight 
ridges, about two metres high, separated by hollows. The ridges are very saline with a salt crust up 
to twenty centimetres thick; nothing grows there. There is less salt in the hollows and a sparse 
population of salt-resisting plants can survive there. Clearly the traces represent the remains of a 
very extensive irrigation system, now almost completely abandoned and saline. 
Fresh water might have been brought to the system from the Euphrates, as was typical in many 
Mesopotamian irrigation systems. On the other hand it might have come from the Shatt al-Arab. 
When the tide rose in the Gulf, twice a day, the fresh water in the Shatt al-Arab was backed up and 
the fresh-water level raised sufficiently for it to enter the system. One other point should be noted: 
the irrigated area lay immediately to the south of the site of the old city of Basra, which was, in the 
late seventh and eighth centuries, one of the two largest cities in Iraq and possibly in the whole 
Muslim world. 
How then are we to understand this ridge and furrow environment? Nelson suggests that we are 
looking at an artificial irrigation system which was increasingly rendered unusable by salinization 
produced by a system which lacked sufficient gradient to produce the flow of drainage to carry the 
salts away. In order to counter this, salty topsoil was removed and piled on to the ridges. The scale 
of the undertaking is breathtaking. Nelson calculates that some forty-five million tons of soil were 
shifted. 
We cannot be certain about the historical background of these extraordinary labours but we can 
suggest a plausible hypothesis. The system is undated and we have no potsherds or other diagnostic 
features which would enable us to make confident statements. However, there is no indication of 
any pre-Islamic irrigation works in this area. The only settlement was the port city of Ubulla/ 
Apologos, which never seems to have been a large urban centre. Furthermore, much of the area was 
probably formerly under the waters of the Gulf, which had by this time receded to the south. The 
balance of probability, therefore, is that we are looking at a system developed in the early Islamic 
period, when the investment was made viable by the presence of the nearby Muslim metropolis of 
Basra. 
The enormous amount of labour required to bring this land into cultivation and to keep it clear 
of salt deposits has already been noted. Nelson calculates that if each man shifted two tons of soil a 
day (which seems a very optimistic estimate, given the extreme heat and lack of shelter in which they 
would have been working) the "work done on the abandoned system would represent nearly a 
decade of effort by 25,000 men".81 
The narrative sources make it clear that it was in the area of southern Mesopotamia that the 
Zanj82 were employed as labourers. Zanj is the term given to the black inhabitants of the west coast 
of Africa. It is not clear when they first began to appear in southern Iraq or on what terms they came, 
but it is likely that they were imported as slaves for the great works undertaken in the Umayyad 
period. It was clearly extremely unpleasant work and the slaves soon expressed their resentment. As 
already mentioned, there was a minor rebellion as early as 70/689-90 and another, more serious one 
in 75/694, both suppressed by the Umayyad authorities. In 255/869 a still more serious and widespread 
revolt began and lasted until the final defeat of the rebels in 270/883. In this case al-Tabarl records 
that the rebels were employed as navvies {kassahin) removing the nitrous topsoil {sibakh) and putting 
it into piles to make the lands of the Shatt al-Arab region cultivable. This report is exactly reflected 
in the evidence on the ground. 
If this reconstruction of the process is generally correct, we can see how the coming of early 
Islamic rule had a major effect on the landscape of the Shatt al-Arab area. The first cause was the 
foundation of the city of Basra and its rapid growth. All these new inhabitants needed to be fed, for 
they had abandoned their pastoral lives and were not given farming land on which they could 
maintain themselves. Furthermore, these men were in receipt of government salaries {cata) and had, 
so to speak, money to spend. It was natural therefore that entrepreneurs would invest in the expansion 
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of agricultural land in the vicinity and a whole irrigation system would be developed. In the medium 
term, however, the new system was unsustainable. Lack of adequate drainage led inevitably to 
salinization of the soil and attempts to keep the salts at bay were doomed to failure. Furthermore, 
Basra, sacked by the Zanj rebels and later by the Qaramita,83 was no longer the lucrative market it 
had been in early Islamic times. There was no economic incentive to restore the cultivation of the 
area. It became a relict landscape, marked by the traces of this moment of agricultural expansion 
but never brought under the plough again. From the late fourth/tenth century Basra itself shifted 
and a new city, still called Basra, developed on the banks of the Shatt al-Arab, where it stands today, 
and the old site was abandoned to the desert, only a few old and venerated tombs remaining to mark 
the spot. 
Baghdad 
My second case study is based on the food supply system of Baghdad. The foundation and 
development of Basra had a major impact on the agriculture of the surrounding area but its effect 
seems to have been fairly localized. The impact of the foundation of Baghdad by contrast was much 
more widespread. The city was founded by the cAbbasid caliph al-Mansur in 144—45/762 as an 
administrative centre and base for the cAbbasid army. This army, which may have amounted to 
some forty thousand men, was largely recruited in Khurasan in north-east Iran and hence the men 
had neither homes nor livelihoods in Iraq.84 They may have been fewer in number than the muqatila 
of early Islamic Basra but they were probably paid more, receiving monthly salaries (as opposed to 
c
ata" once or twice a year) with which to support themselves and their families. While the area was 
not completely uninhabited, Baghdad was essentially a new town; there was no existing city in the 
area and hence no agricultural hinterland or system to supply a dense urban population. 
The growth of the city was prodigious. As noted above, modern calculations suggest that in the 
ninth century the total built-up area was around seven thousand hectares, five times the size of 
contemporary Constantinople and thirteen times the size of the Sasanian capital at Ctesiphon. It is 
likely that the population of this vast metropolis was at least 500,000 and it may well have been 
more.85 As has already been mentioned, this massive increase in the urban population does not seem 
to have been matched by a concomitant expansion of agricultural land in the Diyala plains, the 
immediate agricultural hinterland of the city; indeed the available evidence suggests that the total 
area under cultivation actually decreased from some eight thousand square kilometres in late 
Sasanian times to six thousand square kilometres in the early Islamic period. 
The problems of supplying the city are discussed in the Arabic texts which describe its foundation. 
In these accounts, al-Mansur is shown explaining how the city is to be provisioned. He lays great 
emphasis on the suitability of the site as the centre of a network of water communications: "here is 
the Tigris with nothing between us and China, so everything which comes by sea can reach us by the 
river, as can the provisions (mira) from the Jazira, Armenia and the surrounding areas. And there is 
the Euphrates on which everything from Syria, Raqqa and the surrounding areas may come."86 He 
then pitched his camp by the Sarat canal, one of the major waterways which led from the Euphrates 
to the Tigris. In another passage, the caliph explains the economic and political importance of 
ensuring adequate supply networks. While he was looking for a site for his new capital, he was 
recommended a place called Barimma, which was said to be agreeable and salubrious. The caliph 
spent the night there but in the morning rejected the site: "it will not sustain the army, the notables 
(al-nds) and the social groupings (al-jamdcat). I want only a place which people will find suitable: by 
conforming to their needs it will conform to mine. Prices should not go high there and provisioning 
{al-macund) should not be difficult. If I settled in a place where anything could not be imported by 
land and sea, prices would rise, supplies (mdda) would be in short supply and provisioning would be 
burdensome."87 
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In this narrative he went back to the site of Baghdad which he had already noticed saying, "This 
is the site on which I shall build. Supplies (al-madd) can arrive by the Euphrates, the Tigris and a 
network of canals. Only a place like this will support the army and the general populace (cdmma)."88 
The local dehqan (landowner) explained the advantages of the site in commercial terms: "You, O 
Commander of the Faithful, will be situated on the Sarat canal. Provisions (al-mlra) from the west 
will come to you on ships {sufun) by way of the Euphrates, as will luxury goods {(ard'if) from Syrian 
and Egypt. Provisions (al-mird) will come to you by ship {sufun) from China, India, Basra and Wasit 
up the Tigris and from Armenia and the lands contiguous to it by the Tamarra canal until it reaches 
the Zab. Provisions from Byzantine territory, Amid, the Jazira and Mosul will come to you down 
the Tigris," and he then went on to point out the defensive advantages of a site surrounded by rivers 
and canals which will be "moats {khanddiq) for the Commander of the Faithful's city".89 Of course 
it is impossible to be certain that such dialogues took place but we can be sure that they reflect the 
thinking of the caliph and his advisers and how later generations saw the advantages of the site of 
Baghdad. 
The continuing importance of the Tigris for the supply of Baghdad is revealed in an account of 
the wars which resulted in the take-over of Baghdad by the first of the Buyid rulers, Mucizz al-Dawla 
in 334/946. The Hamdanid Nasir al-Dawla, who was effectively ruler of Mosul and the grain-growing 
areas of the Jazira, was fiercely opposed to the Buyid. His troops confronted the Buyids on the west 
bank of the Tigris at Baghdad and the local farmers had their crops seized by his soldiers. At the 
same time he resorted to economic warfare. On the east bank, where Nasir al-Dawla had installed 
himself, "bread was sold for five rath a dirham (that is very cheap) because barges brought flour 
from Mosul". On the west bank, by contrast, bread was very expensive: "this was because Nasir al-
Dawla prevented imports from Mosul coming to the western side".90 
The effects of the rapid growth of Baghdad can be seen in the Euphrates valley. Recent 
archaeological work has produced evidence of substantial agricultural expansion in the middle 
Euphrates area, where new canals were built to irrigate the riverain plains and new villages founded. 
Between 1987 and 1990 a team led by Sophie Berthier conducted surveys and limited excavations in 
the middle Euphrates valley, between Deir ez-Zor and the Iraqi border at Abu Kamal. The results, 
published in 2001,91 are extremely impressive and provide a fascinating insight into the agricultural 
life of this area. Three of the survey's plans that illustrate the expansion in settlement in the Umayyad 
and cAbbasid periods are republished here (Figs. 1-3). 
Most of this area of the Euphrates valley enjoys between 100 and 150 mm of rain per year, with 
perhaps a bit more in the north-west.92 This is well short of the 200 mm which is the lowest rainfall 
that permits dry farming. Any agricultural activity is therefore based on irrigation. The river flows 
through a valley which might be as wide as fifteen kilometres in some places but is much narrower 
in others. On each side of the valley rise plateaux, that of Syria to the west and the Jazira to the east. 
The height of the escarpment means that raising water from the river to the level of the plateau is 
out of the question. Agriculture is only possible in the floor of the valley between the river and the 
escarpments. 
In places norias are used nowadays to raise water and of course mechanical pumps provide a 
means to supply water to the fields. In early Islamic times, however, large-scale irrigation required 
the construction of canals to take water from the river or its tributaries so that it flowed at the level 
of a metre or two above the surrounding fields. Gravity could then be used to lead the water from 
the main canal into subsidiary irrigation ditches and thence to the fields. These canals, flowing as 
they do between artificial dykes above the level of the valley floor, require constant maintenance, 
both to prevent the channel from silting up and to keep the dykes from being breached. This 
agriculture could be very productive but it was investment-intensive, requiring constant and sustained 
expenditure. Only in certain rare and favourable circumstances could it be undertaken. 
In the lower half of the length of the river surveyed by Berthier and her team, there was no 
evidence of large-scale irrigation, and settlement in the early Islamic period was limited to a handful 
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Fig. 1 Settlement in the middle Euphrates valley, below Deir ez-Zor, late Roman period; from Berthier, 
Peuplement, p. 16. 
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of small sites. The picture in the upper section, however, was very different. Here there were two 
major irrigation projects with rather different profiles and histories. 
The lower one was based on the Dawrin canal system. The Dawrin was drawn not from the 
Euphrates, but from the lower valley of its tributary, the Khabur, which flows into the main river 
from the north. Much of the length of the canal can still be traced. It flowed from the Khabur and 
was led along the main valley of the Euphrates for about 130 km. The channel was usually between 
nine and eleven metres wide93 and probably fairly shallow, only about one metre in depth. 
It appears that the only major settlement in the area in the pre-Islamic period was the Roman 
frontier fortress of Circesium (Arabic Qarqisiya), which lay immediately upstream from the 
confluence of the Khabur and the Euphrates. This represented the furthest outpost of Roman and 
Byzantine control in the Euphrates valley. Beyond that must have been a sort of no-man's land 
where lack of security made agriculture hazardous, if not impossible. The Muslim conquests changed 
this strategic position entirely. From being a frontier war zone, the valley of the middle Euphrates 
became a main highway between two important provinces of the same empire. 
There had been a canal along at least part of the course of the Dawrin canal in the third and 
second millennia BC but it seems to have fallen out of use after that. We have no specific historical 
record of the digging of the Islamic-period canal but al-Tabar! records that the Umayyad caliph 
Hisham b. cAbd al-Malik (r. 105-125/724^13) was given lands known at Dawrin as a qafFa before 
becoming caliph. The land was at this time deserted (khardb) and he asked a secretary called 
Dhuwayb, who was working with him, what should be done. Dhuwayb replied by asking him what 
he wanted in exchange for the land and Hisham said, "Four hundred dinars." Dhuwayb then entered 
"Dawrin and its villages" in the diwans (presumably in his own name) and made a vast amount of 
money out of developing the land. When Hisham became caliph, he refused to give Dhuwayb a job 
and banished him from Syria because of the way in which he had exploited his position.94 If this 
story (which is told to illustrate Hisham's notorious carefulness with money rather than the process 
of agricultural development) has any truth in it, it suggests that the development of Dawrin formed 
part of a whole group of large-scale irrigation projects in the Euphrates valley undertaken by the 
sons of cAbd al-Malik, including that of his brothers Maslama at Balis and SaTd just up river from 
Dawrin. It also shows how an entrepreneur like Dhuwayb could make a fortune from it. The last 
Umayyad caliph seems to have constructed the fortress still known as Marwaniya in the area and 
used Dawrin as a staging post for the army of twenty thousand men led by Ibn Hubayra on its way 
to conquer Iraq in 127/744-45.95 
Archaeological evidence, not from the canal itself but from the seventeen or so villages which 
grew up along its course, also suggests that the canal was developed in the later Umayyad period. It 
continued to be maintained in cAbbasid times with the number of settlements increasing. The canal 
itself was dredged on at least one occasion. By the year 900, however, the canal seems to have been 
abandoned and large-scale irrigation in the area had ceased. Qarqisiya, which had been an important 
fortified city in Umayyad times, was gradually deserted and its role as the most important urban 
centre in the area was taken over by Rahba, upstream from the Dawrin canal. 
The history of the Dawrin canal project raises important issues about the exploitation of land and 
attitudes to landowning and we can perhaps draw a few general conclusions. This area of the Middle 
Euphrates valley was on the frontier between the Roman and Persian empires and it seems that the 
only major settlement in immediately pre-Islamic times was the Roman military outpost at Circesium. 
The area was developed for agriculture by the Umayyad prince Hisham, probably in the second 
decade of the eighth century. This was a period when members of the ruling family were investing 
heavily in qafd'F as a way of boosting their income and political status. With the coming of the 
cAbbasids, most of these lands were given to members of the new ruling family but we have no 
information about the ownership of the Dawrin canal area. As noted, the last Umayyad caliph 
Marwan b. Muhammad (127-32/744-50) had developed a fortress there and it may well be that 
93
 Berthier, Peuplement, 33 Umayyad Caliphate [Albany, 1989] 77) makes no sense at 
94al-Tabari, Ta'rikh ii 1735. This seems to be the most all. 
likely interpretation of the anecdote. Hillenbrand's transla- 95 al-Tabari, Ta'rikh ii 1895, 1909; Berthier, Peuplement 
tion (The History of al-Taban xxvi: The Waning of the 566-67. 
THE FEEDING OF THE FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND 195 
cAbbasid caliphs themselves took it over and it formed part of the royal sawdft.96 This was a period 
of continuing investment, the dredging of the channel for example, and increasing settlement. This 
must be connected with the foundation and phenomenal growth of Baghdad. As noted above, one 
of the reasons al-Mansur gave for choosing the site of Baghdad was its closeness to the Euphrates 
from which the Sarat canal provided a direct link by water, which meant that "everything from 
Syria, Raqqa and the surrounding areas" could be brought to the city.97 The role of the Euphrates 
in the transport of provisions (mira) is stressed in other passages.98 The subsequent development of 
Raqqa and the increasing importance of the river route between Raqqa and Baghdad, effectively the 
twin capitals of the early cAbbasid caliphate, must have increased the value of these lands 
considerably. 
In the ninth century, the capital moved to Samarra, which was not connected to the Euphrates 
by a direct water link, and Raqqa ceased to be used by the caliphs. By the end of the century, much 
of the Jazira was under the control of the Hamdanids and the ravages of the Qaramita at the 
beginning of the tenth century seem to have dealt a final blow to the prosperity of the area. With the 
drying up of the great urban markets and the continuing security problems, there was no incentive 
for continuing the massive investment necessary for maintaining the Dawrin canal. Those villages 
which survived did so on the basis of subsistence agriculture or by supplying the modest needs of the 
little town of Rahba. The remarkable development and collapse of this area can be seen as a direct 
consequence of its economic integration into the wider Muslim empire, a sort of Islamic globalization. 
When circumstances changed, the pattern of settlement and farming returned to what must have 
been its more usual and natural state. 
Further up the river, on the west or Syrian side, Berthier's team investigated the Nahr SaTd or 
Sa'id canal system. This was in many ways similar to the Dawrin canal, both in history and function, 
but at least parts of it were in use over a much longer period. According to al-Baladhurl, the area 
was presented by the caliph al-Walld b. cAbd al-Malik (86-96/705-715) as a qati'a to his brother 
Sa'id, known as SaTd al-Kayr (good SaTd, because he practiced asceticism, nask). Other accounts 
ascribe the gift to cUmar b.cAbd al-cAzTz (99—101/717—20)." He caused the canal to be dug in an area 
which had previously been a jungle (ghayda) infested with lions. Berthier doubts the historicity of 
this account, citing the absence of identifiable Umayyad material along the course of the canal,100 
but, as she acknowledges in other cases, this may not rule out the Umayyad origins of the canal.101 
Two other considerations suggest that the canal known as Nahr Said may indeed have been the 
work of the Umayyad prince of that name. The first is that SaTd was a comparatively obscure 
member of the ruling family, not a man about whose achievements legends grew up; if the canal had 
been ascribed to Hisham, we might have more reason for scepticism. The second is that the canal is 
mentioned by name in a narrative of military events in the reign of Marwan b. Muhammad.102 
The Nahr Said seems to have been in use through the second half of the second/eighth and the 
whole of the third/ninth centuries. As in the case of the Dawrin canal, there is almost no evidence of 
activity in the fourth/tenth century but, in contrast to the Dawrin, it is clear that at least some 
sections of it were repaired in the eleventh century and remained in use until the early fourteenth. 
The canal itself was a gravity-irrigation canal, that is, its channel ran above the level of the fields 
which it irrigated.103 The archaeological evidence suggests the fields it serviced lay between the canal 
and the Euphrates river itself and that it formed a barrier, or at least a demarcation between the 
pastoral lands on the west side and the irrigated lands to the east.104 
Apart from the old Byzantine fortress at Qarqisiya and the Marwaniya there were few major 
settlements along the Dawrin. Along the Nahr SaTd, however, among the fourteen identified 
habitation sites were a number of quasi-urban settlements, one of which, Tell Mohasan, built on a 
Middle Bronze age tell, had an area of 900 x 700 m — though not all of this may have been occupied 
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continuously. Two other such settlements were investigated by the archaeologists. Tell Guftan, 
which may have been the mediaeval Fam Nahr Said (Mouth of the SaTd Canal) had pottery which 
could be dated to the late eighth century in its lowest strata.105 At Tell Qaryat Medad, the earliest 
ceramics recovered from the limited sondages were dated to c. 840.106 
Both canals and the associated settlements show clearly the massive investment in irrigation and 
the consequent expansion of agricultural activity in the eighth and into the ninth century, and both 
show the collapse of the canal systems and the depopulation of a number of sites at the beginning of 
the tenth. Such growth was clearly related to the estate policies of the members of the Umayyad 
family and, after 145/762, the growth of Baghdad as a major market for agricultural produce. 
This development was a process which began in the Umayyad period but reached its fullest extent 
in the first cAbbasid century. Interestingly, the archaeological record is complemented by the written 
sources. Al-BaladhurT describes how these canals were constructed by members of the ruling family 
in the first half of the eighth century. This area of the Euphrates valley had not been farmed 
extensively in Roman or Byzantine times, probably because it lay in a very exposed position 
straddling the frontier between the Roman and Sasanian empires. The effective abolition of the 
frontier after the Muslim conquest opened up this area to agriculture, though it did require active 
investment to allow it to reach its full potential. This agricultural boom was comparatively short-
lived. By the end of the tenth century much of the canal system was dry and many of the villages 
deserted. 
Another aspect of the development of this area can perhaps be seen at the site of Madlnat al-Far 
on the Balikh river, a tributary of the Euphrates.107 This site has been convincingly identified by the 
excavator, C.-P. Haase, with the place known to the Muslim geographers as Hisn Maslama or 
Maslama's castle, said to have been founded by Maslama, a son of the caliph cAbd al-Malik, who 
died in about 120/738-39. He was famous as a leader of Muslim raids into Byzantine Anatolia but 
also appears as sponsor of irrigation projects at Balis on the Euphrates and, as we have seen, in Iraq. 
The initial settlement seems to have been a square enclosure about 330 metres on each side with 
walls, a moat and four gates, one in the middle of each side. It was, to all appearances, a classic 
Umayyad qasr plan. In a second stage, the qasr was rebuilt, the rooms divided up, and new walls 
constructed of a much less regular fabric. At the same the settlement was massively extended to the 
south. This southern area was not planned in the same way: the dwellings were more dispersed and 
the wall which seems to have protected at least part of it was irregularly planned and poorly built. 
The chronology of this settlement is not entirely clear. Umayyad coins and a little ceramic have 
been found in the original square enclosure but the southern extension has only yielded cAbbasid 
material similar to that found in nearby Raqqa. The evidence peters out after 860 and there is no 
evidence of continuous occupation into the tenth century. Haase has seen this site essentially as a 
military base for expeditions on the northern frontier but I would like to propose an alternative or 
complementary interpretation. The square enclosure was indeed developed by Maslama, probably 
as a military base and residence for some of his numerous entourage: it was, then, a typical Umayyad 
qasr in both form and function. After the cAbbasid revolution, the settlement benefited from the 
expansion of agriculture in the Jazira, which can be linked to the development of Baghdad and 
Raqqa as major cities. What had been a princely residence now became an essentially commercial 
centre. The old walls were breached and new settlers built their houses to the south. They were 
farmers, grain merchants and general traders. The city remained prosperous only as long as the 
market for its produce existed; when circumstances changed, it was deserted and never subsequently 
inhabited. 
The impression that the expansion of Hisn Maslama was not an isolated example and that the 
early cAbbasid period was one of more general prosperity in the Balikh river valley is reinforced by 
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Karin Bartl's survey of the valley.108 As in the Euphrates-valley sites surveyed by Berthier et al, 
there is very little material evidence from the Umayyad period. In contrast there is a large volume 
of ceramic evidence from the early cAbbasid period between the eighth and tenth centuries. Settlement 
in the early Islamic period was twice as dense as it had been under Byzantine rule. Most of these 
settlements were very small: seventy out of the eighty showing evidence of certain or probable 
settlement in the early Islamic period were under five hectares. It was a countryside of individual 
farmsteads and hamlets. The most important centre was Hisn Maslama at one hundred hectares. As 
with the Euphrates-valley settlements there is very little evidence of either new or continuing 
occupation in the tenth and eleventh centuries. In common with other commentators, Bartl sees this 
apparent boom as the result of the political and military activities of the cAbbasids, making Raqqa 
their capital and using the Balikh valley as a major route between there and the Byzantine frontier. 
There may well be some truth in this picture but it can also be argued that this settlement 
was essentially an agricultural boom generated by the emergence of huge new markets for grain 
in Raqqa and Baghdad. The Balikh river valley, comparatively well watered and with good river 
communications, was ideally placed to take advantage of these conditions. The fact that most of the 
settlements were small and unfortified and that at Hisn Maslama, the only site where there is any 
evidence of fortifications, the walls of the old qasr were demolished to allow the settlement to expand, 
all suggest that agriculture, not strategic planning, was a more likely source of this prosperity. 
Conclusion 
The sources, both textual and archaeological, point to an enormous amount of agricultural 
development in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys and the Sawad of Iraq in the Umayyad and cAbbasid 
periods. This led to lands being brought under cultivation in some areas which have not really been 
exploited before or since at any time in the longue duree of Mesopotamian agriculture. This 
agricultural boom lasted for a comparatively short period. It began in some areas immediately after 
the Muslim conquests of the 630s and early 640s, but by the beginning of the tenth century it had 
come to a halt and many of the lands which had been so painstakingly reclaimed were being deserted. 
The growth happened at different times in different places: the agricultural developments in the 
Basra countryside were essentially a phenomenon of the period of the Rashidun and Umayyad 
caliphs. The developments in the Euphrates valley began in the late Umayyad period and continued 
well into cAbbasid times. In all areas, however, the tenth century saw the decay of these systems. 
Before trying to establish the reasons for this collapse, some important points must be borne in 
mind. The agricultural expansion was the product of a number of different circumstances which 
came together at this time. Of the four factors permitting this economic growth which were suggested 
at the beginning of this paper, the flow of the rivers and the potentiality of water transport were 
permanent features of the environment, although of course the irrigation systems were not. The 
early Islamic fiscal system, the urban markets it generated and the security of landholding, on the 
other hand, were conditional on the survival of the early Islamic state structure and when the 
structure collapsed, they vanished. 
This paper is not the place in which to examine the reasons for the vicissitudes of the caliphal 
government in the late ninth and early tenth centuries,109 but a few points should be stressed. The 
feeding of Baghdad was a precarious business and when supplies from outside were interrupted the 
effects were catastrophic. In 334/946, when, as mentioned above, supplies were not reaching the city 
from the Jazira, 
Prices rose so high that people had absolutely no bread and ate the dead, or grass or any creature that had 
died a natural death, or carrion. When a horse dropped dung, a number of people collected and searched 
the dung for barleycorns to pick out and eat. Cotton-seed would be taken, moistened with water and 
spread on an iron plate, which was then put on a fire until it was dry and the seed was then eaten; this 
produced tumours in the intestines from which most of the eaters died and the survivors looked like 
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corpses. Men, women and children would stand on the highroad perishing of famine and crying. "Hunger, 
hunger," until they died. If anyone found a little bread, he would hide it under his clothes, else it would be 
snatched from him. So many were the corpses that they could not be buried in time and the dogs devoured 
their flesh. The poor migrated in vast numbers and continuous lines to Basra to eat dates and most of them 
perished on the road; those of them who reached the place died after a short time. A woman of the 
Hashimite family (that is the family of the Prophet) was found to have stolen a child and baked him alive 
in an oven. She had partly eaten him and was seized eating the remainder; she was put to death.110 
This is the first account of a major famine in Baghdad and it is significant that it was caused in 
large measure by the interruption of grain supplies from the Jazira. 
A major problem was that the Jazira became politically detached from Baghdad under rule of the 
Hamdanid dynasty. This was a gradual process of disengagement rather than a single dramatic 
move, but by 335/946 the Hamdanids effectively ruled over the Middle Tigris and Euphrates valleys 
from Tikrit north. Under the terms of the treaty which established this, the Hamdanid ruler Nasir 
al-Dawla was to send no revenue to Baghdad but he was to send plentiful provisions (al-mird) on 
which no tax (duraybd) was to be paid (to Nasir al-Dawla presumably).111 The treaty may never have 
been implemented because hostilities between the two sides soon flared up again but it shows the 
importance that the Buyid ruler Mucizz al-Dawla and the Baghdad authorities attached to supplies 
from the Jazira. From the comment about taxation, it would seem that the Hamdanid was asked to 
allow free trade rather than agreeing to pay tribute in kind. 
As an afterthought, it should perhaps be noted that the system allowed the growth of extremely 
large cities and this urbanism had a profound effect on the development of Arabic and Islamic 
culture. Baghdad in its heyday was a city which supported a critical mass of literate people. It 
allowed, perhaps for the first time in human history, the emergence of a genuine book trade, and 
became an environment in which an author could write a book and hope to sell enough copies to 
make a living rather than being dependent on private wealth or on the patronage of a ruler or 
religious institution. 
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